BGP hijack of Twitter by Russian ISP
From 12:05-12:50 UTC, Russian ISP RTComm (AS8342) hijacked a prefix (104.244.42.0/24) belonging to Twitter. Thankfully, the hijack didn’t propagate far due to a RPKI ROA which asserted AS13414 was the rightful origin.
It’s worth noting that this is the same prefix hijacked during the coup in Myanmar last year. This is probably just reflective of the fact that this prefix is a common target for censorship. In both BGP hijack instances, the objective was likely to blackhole traffic but the route temporarily leaked out of the country.
Our report was highlighted in stories by Ars Technica, ITNews, a tweet by the CISO of Twitter and finally in an excellent blog post by Aftab Siddiqui of MANRS.
Doug Madory is the director of internet analysis for Kentik where he works on internet infrastructure analysis. The Washington Post dubbed him “The Man who can see the Internet” for his reputation in identifying significant developments in the global layout of the internet. Doug is regularly quoted by major news outlets about developments ranging from national blackouts to BGP hijacks to the activation of submarine cables. Prior to Kentik, he was the lead analyst for Oracle’s internet intelligence team (formerly Dyn Research and Renesys).
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